‘Heads Cast in Metaphysical Moulds’ Damaris Masham on the Method and Nature of Metaphysics by Lascano, Marcy P.
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/11795820/WORKINGFOLDER/HOMA/9781107178687C01.3D 7 [7–28] 8.11.2017 12:16PM
part i
Meta-Metaphysics
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/11795820/WORKINGFOLDER/HOMA/9781107178687C01.3D 8 [7–28] 8.11.2017 12:16PM
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/11795820/WORKINGFOLDER/HOMA/9781107178687C01.3D 9 [7–28] 8.11.2017 12:16PM
chapter 1
‘Heads Cast in Metaphysical Moulds’




If you come across the term ‘metaphysics’ in Damaris Masham’s work, it is
likely that it will be in the context of an insult. 1 She may, for instance,
claim that someone has an ‘extraordinary, and Metaphysical Constitution’
that causes him to be ‘unacquainted with theWorld, and Humane Nature’
(Masham 1696: 37). Or she may claim that metaphysical speculations arise
from being ‘mighty fond of’ or ‘prepossess’d with an hypothesis’ or because
one is ‘tempted by Affection of Novelty’ (Masham 1696: 10, 46, 6). She
might even sarcastically claim that ‘He whose Head is cast in
a Metaphysical Mould has, it may be, Privileges of Nature which accom-
pany it, that ordinary Mortals are Strangers to’ (Masham 1696: 36).
Masham disparages the notion of metaphysics when she criticises the
systematic philosophies held by John Norris, Nicolas Malebranche, and
G.W. Leibniz. However, Masham is willing to discuss, and sometimes put
forth her own views concerning, the existence and nature of God, the
essence of substances, the possibility of intelligence elsewhere in the uni-
verse, the nature of causation, and the nature of freedom. All of these are
topics that today we would firmly assent to as metaphysical. So, a chapter
on Damaris Masham’s metaphysics must be set in the context of seven-
teenth-century debates about the subject matter and methodology of
metaphysics.
In this chapter, first we will provide a brief discussion of part of the larger
debates concerning metaphysics and attempt to place Masham alongside
1 I would like to thank Sarah Hutton and Andrew Janiak for directing me to literature concerning
seventeenth-century debates about metaphysics. I would also like to thank Emily Thomas for
inviting me to contribute to the volume and for her excellent suggestions and comments on my
chapter.
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her friend John Locke in holding that the subject matter of metaphysics is
usually either strictly the providence of revelation or is beyond human
understanding. Next, we will explore Masham’s criticisms of Norris,
Malebranche, and Leibniz to see how these views inform her objections.
Here, it will become clear that Masham eschews metaphysics as an a priori
investigation into supernatural causes and spirits. She argues that not only
do we lack positive evidence for the truth of these metaphysical hypotheses,
but we have good reason – from experience and revelation – to believe
them false. Finally, we will turn briefly to some of Masham’s positive views
concerning the existence and nature of God, the nature of substances, and
human freedom. Here, we will see that while Masham does not approve of
metaphysical theses that seemingly conflict with our experience of the
world, we can know some things about the nature of God and ourselves
through experience and reason. This leaves room for Masham to engage in
a fair amount of what we would currently consider metaphysical discourse.
The Debates about ‘Metaphysicks’
In the seventeenth century, as Sarah Hutton notes, ‘metaphysics came to
be derided as “abstruse” or “useless” knowledge, and it was often associated
with scholasticism’ (Hutton 2015: 15). Part of the problem was that there
was no clear definition of the subject matter of metaphysics. Dimitri
Levitin notes, ‘Aristotle had been famously ambiguous’ about the subject
matter of metaphysics (Levitin 2016: 69).2 On the one hand, he called it
‘first philosophy,’ and in this sense it was the study of being qua being, or
the study of the nature of matter. On the other hand, he equated it with the
study of theology, which was understood as the study of supernatural
causes and spirits (Levitin 2016: 69).3 This confusion about the subject
matter of metaphysics, along with the emergence of experimental natural
philosophy, led to disputes about how to understand metaphysics and
what role, if any, it might play as a part of natural theology, natural
philosophy, or both. Figures like Thomas Hobbes held that metaphysics
was properly understood as ‘first philosophy’ or natural philosophy, while
others, like HenryMore, held that metaphysics was properly understood as
natural theology. There are two issues at stake in this debate. The first issue,
as noted earlier, is the subject matter of metaphysics. Is it the material
2 See also Hutton 2015: 15–6; and for a very detailed explanation of the various positions taken in the
debate, see Levitin 2015: 230–446.
3 Levitin cites Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV 1003a21 and 1026a19-20.
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world and perhaps the soul (as considered as part of the union or mind)?
Or is it the supernatural world of God and spirits? The second problem is
the issue of methodology. Is it possible to use reason and deduction from
principles alone to discover natural, as well as supernatural, truths? Or
must we use experience to understand things in the world while regulating
most of theology to what is gleaned from reason and revelation? These two
issues are important for placing Masham’s discussions in context.
Unfortunately, she does not have a work dedicated to epistemological
and methodological issues (although she does note some of her views in
her works). However, Masham’s close intellectual friendship with Locke,
and the similarity of their views on issues concerning knowledge and
methodology, indicate that an examination of Locke’s views on this subject
will help us to better understand Masham’s position.4
In the Essay on Human Understanding, Locke tells us that there are three
subjects, or sciences, fit for human understanding. The first is the nature of
things as they are in themselves, the second is ethics, or what we ought to
do, and the third is semantics. Since it is the first subject that concerns us, it
is this we will focus on here. Locke discusses the subject as follows,
First, The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings,
their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations; whereby I mean not only
Matter, and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures,
Constitutions, and Operations, as well as Bodies. This, in a little more
enlarged Sense of theWord, I call physika, or natural Philosophy. The end of
this, is bare speculative Truth, and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man
any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits,
Bodies; or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, &c. (Locke
1979: 720)
Here, it seems that Locke wants to take the two definitions of metaphysics
from Aristotle and combine them all into the subject matter of natural
philosophy.5 In doing so, it might seem he undercuts metaphysics as a part
4 Locke and Masham were close personally and philosophically. While there is some debate over the
extent to which Masham influenced Locke’s philosophical work, there is no doubt about his
influence on hers. See Broad 2006, Buickerood 2009, Hutton 1993 and 2015, O’Donnell 1984, and
Springborg 1998. Both of her published works have strong Lockean frameworks and, since both were
published anonymously, contemporaries took them both for Locke’s work. During the later years of
his life, Locke resided in Masham’s house. These years were productive philosophically for both
Locke and Masham. It was during this period that Locke encouraged the publication of her two
works: the Discourse Concerning the Love of God and Occasional Thoughts Concerning a Vertuous or
Christian Life.
5 For a discussion of how Hobbes makes this move, see Levitin 2015: 242–52. We should also note that
the study of spirit or soul was often considered part of natural philosophy as it concerned the nature
of human beings.
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of philosophy. However, Locke expands his discussion in Some Thoughts
Concerning Education, which Masham praises in her own Occasional
Thoughts. There, Locke writes, ‘Natural Philosophy being the Knowledge
of the Principles, Properties, and Operations of Things, as they are in
themselves, I imagine there are Two Parts of it, one comprehending Spirits
with their Nature and Qualities; and the other Bodies. The first of these is
usually referr’d toMetaphysicks.’ (Locke 1989: 245). So, it seems that Locke
was willing to afford metaphysics some role in natural philosophy.
Metaphysics is the study of the nature and qualities of spirit. Locke,
however, goes on to say that our knowledge of spirits can only come
through revelation. But what exactly is Locke’s objection to metaphysics
as a part of natural philosophy?
It seems that a large part of Locke’s aversion to metaphysics comes from
his epistemological claim that human beings cannot know the essence of
substances. Because all of our ideas come to us through the senses, and
because the real, or primary, qualities of things are not subject to human
sense, we cannot know the essence of substance. We can only understand
the nominal essences of things, which are based on our ideas of secondary
qualities – that is, those qualities that affect our sense organs. Locke thinks
that when we engage in metaphysics, we are attaching definitions, based on
incomplete ideas of the entities to which they are supposed to apply, to real
things in the world. But since our ideas of them are incomplete, we gain no
real knowledge of the entities by doing so. He writes,
By this method one may make Demonstrations and undoubted
Propositions in Words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the
Knowledge of the Truth of Things: v. g. he that having learnt these
following Words, with their ordinary mutual relative Acceptations annexed
to them; v. g. Substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive,
rational, may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without
knowing at all what the Soul really is: and of this sort, a Man may find an
infinite number of Propositions, Reasonings, and Conclusions, in Books of
Metaphysicks, School-Divinity, and some sort of natural Philosophy; and,
after all, know as little of GOD, Spirits, or Bodies, as he did before he set out.
(Locke 1979: 615)
So much for the possibility of discovering the nature or qualities of the soul
by means of providing definitions and demonstrations. But Locke’s worry
is not merely that certain methodologies in metaphysics will not provide
results. For it seems that no methodology is adequate to the task of
discerning truths in metaphysics. For instance, we might think that the
use of hypotheses would help to formulate ideas of the causes and
12 marcy p. lascano
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principles of things and would be such that Locke would see the advantage
of them for natural philosophy. However, his view seems to be that
hypotheses are often made to fit metaphysical presuppositions, which
makes them fairly useless in the discovery of truth. He writes,
Not that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of any
probable hypothesis whatsoever: hypotheses, if they are well made, are at
least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new discoveries. But
my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the
mind, that would always penetrate into the causes of things, and have
principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined
particulars, and made several experiments, in that thing which we would
explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether
our principles will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with
one phenomenon of nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain
another. And at least that we take care that the name of Principles deceive us
not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable
truth, which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture; such as are most
(I had almost said all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy. (Locke
1979: 648)
Again, the main objection seems to be that when we work with hypotheses
in natural philosophy we assume that we have knowledge about the
natures, principles, or essences of things of which we do not. All these
things lead Locke to declare that ‘This way of getting and improving our
knowledge in substances only by experience and history, which is all that the
weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in this
world can attain to, makes me suspect that natural philosophy is not
capable is being made a science’ (Locke 1979: 645). For Locke, the only
way to achieve some knowledge of the nature of body is through our
experience of bodies, and given that we can have no experience of souls at
all, our knowledge of these entities can only come through revelation.
It is in the context of these debates that we must place Masham’s
disparaging comments about metaphysics and her criticisms of particular
metaphysical hypotheses. We will examine two places where Masham
expresses doubts about the usefulness of metaphysical hypotheses: in her
Discourse Concerning the Love of God and in her correspondence with
Leibniz.
Masham’s Discourse Concerning the Love of God is a sustained attack on
the view that God should be the sole object of our desirous love presented
by John Norris in his published correspondence with Mary Astell. In the
correspondence, Norris defends Nicolas Malebranche’s occasionalism,
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which is the view that God is the only efficient cause and that creatures are
mere occasional causes of his actions. Norris argues that since God is the
sole author of our pleasure, he should be the sole object of our love to the
exclusion of loving other creatures with anything but well wishing.
Masham’s correspondence with G. W. Leibniz began in 1704. In the
correspondence, she provides objections to Leibniz’s pre-established har-
mony between minds and bodies, his view of unextended souls, and his
methodology. In what follows, we will see that Masham’s objections to
Malebranche’s and Leibniz’s views are very much in keeping with Locke’s
views of epistemology, metaphysics, and hypotheses.
Criticisms of Metaphysics
As noted earlier, Masham’s book, Discourse Concerning the Love of God,
was prompted by Mary Astell’s and John Norris’s published correspon-
dence, Letters Concerning the Love of God, wherein Norris defends
Malebranche’s doctrine of seeing all things in God, and both he and
Astell argue that God should be the sole object of our desirous love.6
Masham makes numerous arguments against the Malebranchean doc-
trine of occasionalism in the Discourse.7 The occasionalist, according to
Masham, is one who holds that God is the only efficient cause in the
world. Creatures are efficaciously inert, and are only occasional causes of
God’s efficient will. In addition, as Norris argues in the correspondence
with Astell, because God is the sole efficient cause of all our pleasure, he is
also the only proper object of all our desirous love (where the object is
loved for its own sake). Creatures, they argue, should be the objects of our
benevolent love (where one desires the well-being of the object) only.
In the Preface to her Discourse, Masham notes that the hypothesis of
occasional causes is derived from the doctrine of ‘seeing all things in
God’.8Masham writes that Malebranche’s doctrine is ‘in no great danger’
of being generally accepted. This on account of ‘It being too Visionary to
be likely to be received by many Intelligent Persons; And too abstruse to
be easily entertain’d by those who are altogether unconversant with
Scholastick Speculations’ (Masham 1696: A3).
6 For more on the debate between Astell and Masham, see Broad 2002 and 2003, Hutton 2013 and
2014, and Wilson 2004.
7 While Masham’s criticisms are prompted by the Norris and Astell correspondence, she cites both
Norris’s works and Malebranche’s works in the Discourse.
8 Masham describes the doctrine of ‘seeing all things in God’ as the claim that all our ideas and
perceptions come directly from God.
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Masham argues against Norris’s definition of love, claiming that his
definition is the result of a deduction from his hypothesis of seeing all
things in God. She claims that instead of following this procedure for
understanding love, we should examine our own experience of love and the
various desires that accompany it. She writes,
But as that Definition which Mr. N. has given us, (viz. That Love is that
Original Weight, Bent or Indeavour, whereby the Soul stands inclin’d to,
and is mov’d forwards to Good in general, or Happiness) tells as not so well
what Love is, as our own Hearts can when we consult them; So perhaps an
Examination of them will not only better acquaint us with the Nature of our
Passions; but also direct us better to the Measures of their Regulation, than
Notions concerning them deduced from the Consequences of an
Hypothesis. (Masham 1696: 19–20)
Here, Masham asserts that the better method for discovering the nature of
human love is examining our experiences of love. She claims that Norris’
definition does not tell us what love really is, but rather is devised to
conform to his metaphysical views. Masham’s own definition is ‘Love
being only a Name given to that Disposition, or Act of Mind, we find in
our selves towards anything we are pleas’d with’ (Masham 1696: 18).9 She
goes on to explain her love of God, her children and neighbours, and
herself and to argue that while there is only one kind of love, the desires
that accompany the feeling of love vary according to the object of love.
Masham also argues that there is no practical difference between an
occasional cause and an efficient cause. Masham notes that according to
the hypothesis of ‘seeing all things in God’, creatures are still causes of our
sensations, albeit merely occasional causes. However, occasional causes are
such that (1) they are always accompanied by their effect, and (2) without
them the effect is not produced (Masham 1696: 31). If this is so, she asks, in
what sense are occasional causes different to us than efficient causes? She
writes,
There being none of [creatures], perhaps, that we approach, which either
does not, or may not, contribute to our Good, or Ill; And which truly are
not in Effect allow’d to do so, by those who deny them to be Efficient
Causes. For it will be found to amount to the same thing in regard of us, and
our Obligation to desire them, whether they are Efficient, or Occasional
Causes, of our pleasing Sensations: The proof of which last Opinion, (taken
9 Compare with Locke: ‘But it suffices to note, that our Ideas of Love and Hatred, are but the
Dispositions of the Mind, in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caused in us’ Locke
1979: 230.
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from their own Ignorance of any other way to explain the Nature of our
Ideas, and Perceptions) They can hardly feel the force of; Without having
a great Opinion of their own Faculties, or a very small one of the Power, and
Wisdom of God. And they must also be very clear sighted, if they can
discern how this Hypothesis of seeing all things in God, helps us one jot
further in the Knowledge of our Ideas, and Perceptions; which is the thing it
was Primarily pretended to be design’d for. They who advance this Notion,
do only fetch a Circuit, and then return where they were before, without
gaining any advantage, by Derogating (as they do) from the Wisdom of
God, in framing his Creatures like the Idols of the Heathen, that have Eyes,
and see not; Ears, and hear not, &c. (Masham 1696: 30–1)
There are two points to focus on in this paragraph. The first is the
complaint that the distinction between efficient and occasional causes
does not make any difference to our experience of the world. Masham
notes that the colour of the flower will cause pleasure and desire in us
whether we understand its power to do so as coming directly from the
flower or from God. Since there is no way to discern that the power of the
flower to affect us comes from God, our desire will be directed at the
flower. Moreover, even according to the occasionalist, the flower is neces-
sary for the pleasurable experience. Thus, the doctrine of occasionalismwill
have not changed our desires. According to Masham, this makes the
doctrine irrelevant, since we act only upon what we find pleasurable and
so desire. However, the doctrine is not irrelevant as it pertains to God’s
wisdom. She continues,
But the Wisdom of God cannot herein be equally admired, because it is not
equally conspicuous. For if God immediately exhibits to me all my Ideas,
and that I do not truly see with my Eyes, and hear with my Ears, then all that
wonderful Exactness and curious Workmanship, in framing the Organs of
Sense, seems superfluous and vain; Which is no small Reflection upon
infinite Wisdom. (Masham 1696: 32)
Masham argues that God’s creation becomes useless if occasionalism is
true. The intricate working of the human body and all the other parts of
nature are mere stage-setting for God’s acts. However, this seems ineffi-
cient and wasteful – not to mention duplicitous. Thus, the doctrine that
the things in nature are not efficient causes, as they seem to us to be, is
unbefitting of God’s wisdom.
The second point to note is Masham’s accusation that ‘They who
advance this Notion, do only fetch a Circuit, and then return where they
were before’ (Masham 1696: 30–1). That is, she accuses them of circular
reasoning. While Masham does not make the circularity explicit, it seems
16 marcy p. lascano
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to be as follows. The doctrine of seeing all things in God, according to
Masham, is supposed to explain our ideas and perceptions. However, the
doctrine forces one to suppose that creatures are mere occasional causes
and not the efficient causes of ideas or perceptions. This, in turn, implies
that we really do not have ideas or perceptions, since these only belong to
God, and so we end up without an account at all. Here, we should note the
similarity to Locke’s claim that we can define propositions about terms
without advancing at all in our knowledge of those terms.
Masham claims that one of the main difficulties arising from the doc-
trine of occasionalism is how one could come to know its truth. She
acknowledges that we have pleasing sensations even in infancy, but how
is it possible that a baby understands that these pleasing sensations do not
come from objects themselves, but from God alone? If a baby or a child
cannot know that it is sinful to desire any object other than God, then they
are doomed to sin. Masham argues that the best route to knowledge of
God’s existence is through the love of his creation. If we cannot know that
God exists, then we cannot know that it is sinful to love creatures. But if
knowing his existence requires the love of creatures first, then everyone is
doomed to sin. She writes,
If this be so, this seems also to lay an Imputation upon the Wisdom and
Goodness of God, who has laid the Foundation of our Duty in a Reason
which he has concealed from us. For this great Cause why we should love
him alone, (viz. because the Creatures are not the efficient Causes of our
Sensations) is so hidden from us by all the Art, and Contrivance, observable
in Nature, that if it were purposely design’d to be conceal’d, and we
purposely intended to be misled, it could not be more so. For in Effect till
this last Age, it has not been discover’d; Or at least very sparingly; And even
still (as it seems) only Heads cast in Metaphysical Moulds are capable of it.
(Masham 1696: 32–3)
Since occasionalism is not a doctrine that can be understood at a young age
(or perhaps at any age), there is no avoiding these problems. Masham goes
on to argue that the idea that creatures are not efficient causes is ‘only an
Opinion grounded on an Hypothesis, perhaps Demonstrably false; That
has evidently no proof, but the poor one from our Ignorance, that yet is not
at all help’d by this Hypothesis: Which is (therefore) as well as for the Ends
of Morality, plainly useless’ (Masham 1696: 118–9).
Finally, she argues that if occasionalism were true, then God would
partake in our wickedness. Masham noted that the occasionalist holds that
when we choose to love a finite being or object and receive pleasure and
delight from such an object, we sin.
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No Creature he says, indeed, can be Loved, or Desired, without Defrauding
God, and even committing the Sin of Idolatry . . . Consequently therefore,
there can be no more hateful Sin to the Almighty than (feeling Cold, or
Hunger) to desire Fire, or Food, as any good to us: But he tells us at the same
time, That tho’ the things which satisfie these Natural Cravings are by no
means to be desired as Goods; Yet they may be securely sought for as such,
and enjoyed . . . He whose Head is cast in a Metaphysical Mould has, it may
be, Privileges of Nature which accompany it, that ordinary Mortals are
Strangers to. (Masham 1696: 35)
The desire of food as a good when one is hungry or of fire when one is cold
is sinful. Masham holds that there is no way we could discern this view by
experience or reason. It is quite natural to desire such things in these
situations, and surely it is God who has set up our constitutions to desire
these things as such. But the advocate of seeing all things in Godmust hold
that not only does God take part in our sin, but he also is forced to reward
us for it – with pleasure. Masham acknowledges that this is what makes sin
so bad according to this view. She writes,
But the Author of this Hypothesis tells us, that this is that indeed which
makes Sin to be so exceeding sinful, viz., that we oblige God in Virtue of
that first immutable Law, or Order, which he has established (that is, of
exciting Sentiments of Pleasure in us upon some operations of Bodies upon
us) to Reward our Transgressions against him with Pleasure and Delight.
It is strange that we cannot seem sinful enough, without having a Power of
forcing God to be a Partner in ourWickedness! But this is a Consequence of
an Hypothesis whose uselesness, and want of proof, are alone sufficient
Causes for rejecting it. And if we will once quit what Reason and Revelation
evidently and plainly tell us, to build our Religion upon the foundation of
uncertain Opinions; where must we stop? (Masham 1696: 102–3)
That God would be forced to reward us for sin is something that Masham
thinks is also unbefitting God’s wisdom and justice. Moreover, she ridi-
cules the view by claiming that we would have power (over God), contrary
to the hypothesis, if we were able to force God to reward us for our
wickedness.
When we consider Masham’s arguments against occasionalism, the
overall argument against the view becomes clear. First, there is no positive
evidence for occasionalism – neither from experience, reason, nor revela-
tion. This view would not cause individuals to behave any differently with
respect to morality if it were true. Second, there is positive evidence against
the view. The occasionalist makes God’s creation superfluous, and so
undermines God’s wisdom. God’s justice is also undermined because the
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doctrine of occasionalism cannot be known, and therefore dooms all of
creation to sin. For these reasons, Masham believes that we should reject
the doctrine.
Causal relations are also the main subject of Masham’s correspondence
with Leibniz. Masham and Leibniz discuss his system of simple beings, or
souls (monads), and his doctrine of pre-established harmony. First,
Masham explains how she understands of his system in her letter of
3 June 1704.
Any Action of the soul upon Matter, or of Matter upon the Soul is
Inconceivable: These two have theire Laws distinct. Bodies follow the
Laws of Mechanisme, and have a tendencie to change suivant les Forces
Mouvantes. Souls produce in themselves Internal Actions and have
a tendencie to change according to the Perception that they have of Good
or Ill. Now Soul and Body, following each theire Proper Laws, and neither
of them acting thereby upon, or Affecting the other, such Effects are yet
produc’d from a Harmonie Preestablish’d be twixt these Substances, as if
there was a real communication betweene them. So that the Body acting
constantly by its owne Laws ofMechanisme without receiving any Variation
or change therein from any Action of the Soul dos yet always correspond to
the Passions and Perceptions which the Soul hath. And the Soul, in like
Manner, tho not operated upon by the Motions of Matter, has yet at the
same time that the Body Acts according to its Laws of Mechanisme, certain
Perceptions or Modifications which fail not to answer thereunto. (Leibniz
1923: 585401)10
Masham understands that since simple beings are unextended, immaterial,
and completely independent of bodies, Leibniz must give an account of
how it is that they seem to interact with bodies. For Leibniz, the story
involves a pre-established harmony between the perceptions of monads
and the phenomena of body. God sets up a perfect correspondence
between these two realms. Masham believes that Leibniz’s system of pre-
established harmony is consistent with God’s wisdom. However, she does
not think that this means it is true. She criticises Leibniz’s claim to truth in
a way similar to her criticisms of Malebranche’s occasionalism. In her letter
of 3 June 1704, she writes,
10 All references to the Masham-Leibniz correspondence are from Leibniz 1923, although the whole
correspondence may also be found in Leibniz 1965, a partial translation is available in Leibniz 1998,
and all of Masham’s letters are collected in Atherton 1994. Masham’s letters are written in English
and Leibniz’s in French. There is currently no complete English translation of Leibniz’s side of the
correspondence.
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But it appears not yet to me that This is more than an Hypothesis; for as
Gods ways are not limited by our Conceptions; the unintelligibleness or
inconceivablness by us of any way but one, dos not, methinks, much induce
a Beleefe of that, being the way which God has chosen to make use of. Yet
such an inference as this from our Ignorance, I remember P. Malebranche
(or some other assertor of his Hypothesis) would make in behalf of occa-
sional causes: to which Hypothesis, amongst other exceptions, I think there
is one, which I cannot, without your help, see, but that yours is alike liable
to. And that is, from the Organization of the Body: wherin all that Nice
Curiositie that is discoverable seeming Useless: becomes Superfluous and
lost labour. (Leibniz 1923: 585401)
Here, we see Masham claiming that to move from framing a hypothesis
that fits with some of the data to affirming its truth is a mistake. She calls it
an ‘inference from our ignorance’ (a criticism she makes of Malebranche’s
view as well), because we cannot know all the possible ways in which God
might work in the world. Moreover, she claims that Leibniz’s pre-
established harmony has the same fault as Malebranche’s occasionalism
in that it makes God’s works superfluous. She repeats her claims that God’s
ways are beyond our understanding in a later letter dated 8 August 1704.
But if you infer the Truth of this Notion onely from its being the most
Agreable one that you can Frame to that Attribute of God, this, Singly,
seemes to me not to be Concludeing: Since we can, in my opinion, onely
infer from thence that whatsoever God dos must be according to infinite
Wisdome: but are not able with our short and narrow Views to determine
what the operations of an Infinitely Wise Being must be. (Leibniz 1923:
585601)
The limitations of human knowledge make it impossible to know the
mechanisms by which God has set up the world. However, Masham thinks
that it is clear that some systems are more fitting of God’s wisdom and
justice than others. While she seems to prefer Leibniz’s pre-established
harmony to Malebranche’s occasionalism, it is also clear that she thinks
there is little reason or evidence for believing either of them to be true. Her
primary reason for this is that they both seem to make God’s creation,
which she sees as good and useful, largely useless. Masham’s criticisms of
the Malebranchean and Leibnizian views of causation turn on our inability
to know that they are true and the ways in which they conflict with what we
know from experience and revelation about God and his creation. We will
now turn to Masham’s positive views concerning metaphysical topics.
Masham’s views in metaphysics are confined to those topics that are
necessary or conducive to understanding our place in the world and our
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duty to God and creatures. We will see that Masham’s views are based on
experience of the world, in keeping with a significant amount of epistemic
modesty, and are confined to things we know to be consistent with God’s
nature.
Metaphysical Views: Mind and Body, God, and Freedom
As noted earlier, Masham criticises the causal views of both Malebranche
and Leibniz. However, in the correspondence with Leibniz, Masham puts
forth her own hypothesis regarding the relationship between mind and
body. Hers allows for the real interaction between minds and bodies
because they have something in common – extension. She begins by
claiming that unextended substance is something inconceivable. She writes
in her letter of 8 August 1704,
. . . and Extension is to me, inseparable from the notion of all substance.
I am yet sensible that we ought not to reject truths because they are not
imaginable by us (where there is ground to admit them). But truth being but
the attributing certain affections conceiv’d to belong to the subject in
question. I can by no meanes attribute any thing to a subject whereof
I have no conception at all; as I am conscious to my self I have not of
unextended substance . . . from whence I can affirm or deny any thing
concerning it. (Leibniz 1923: 585601)
Unextended substance is something inconceivable and therefore we cannot
say what attributes such a thing may have. Masham takes our inability to
conceive of an unextended substance as a reason for rejecting them.
Moreover, all our experience is of extended substances. This leads her to
claim that we have reason to believe that all substances are extended. Her
most extended discussion of substance is contained in this letter of
8 August 1704. She writes,
. . . but my owne Beleefe that there is no substance whatever unextended is
(as I have already said), grounded upon this that I have no conception of
such a thing. I cannot yet but conceive two very different substances to be in
the universe, tho exstnsion alike agrees to them both. For I clearly conceive
an extension without soliditie, and a solid extension: to some system of
which last if it should be affirm’d that God did annex thought, I see no
absurditie in this from there being nothing in extension and impenetrability
or soliditie, from whence thought can naturally, or by a train of causes be
deriv’d; the which I beleeve to be demonstrable it cannot be. But that was
never suppos’d by me; and my question in the case would be this: whether
god could not as conceivably by us as create an unextended substance, and
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then unite it an extended substance (wherein, by the way, there is methinks
on your side two difficulties for one) whether God, I say, could not as
conceivably by us as his Doing this would be, add (if he so pleas’d) the
Power of Thinking to that substance which has soliditie. Soliditie and
thought being both of them but attributes of some unknown substance
and I see not why it may not be one and the same which is the common
support of Both These; there appearing to me no contradiction in a so
existence of thought and soliditie in the same substance. Neither can
I apprehend it to be more inexplicable that God should give thought to
a substance which I know not, but whereof I know some of its attributes,
than to another, suppos’d, substance of whose very Being I have no con-
ception at all, and that any substance whatsoever should have thought
belonging to it, or resulting from it, otherwise than as God has will’d it
shall have so, I cannot apprehend. (Leibniz 1923: 585601–2)
In this part of the letter, Masham claims that she can conceive of two types of
substance in the world: (1) non-solid extension, and (2) solid extension.11
By non-solid extension, it seems likely that Masham is referring to spiritual
substance, as in a mind or soul. However, Masham goes on to defend John
Locke’s claim from the Essay on Human Understanding (Locke 1979: 540–3)
that God might ‘superadd’ thought to matter. Here, Masham argues that
there is no contradiction inGod’s adding the power of thought tomatter since
it is well within God’s power to add an attribute to a substance.Moreover, she
argues that our inability to conceive of howGod should do this is no barrier to
its being true, for we do not understand howGodmight make an unextended
substance or how he could make such a substance interact with an extended
substance. Masham suggests that there may be one substance underlying the
attributes of both thought and substance. This statement would have imme-
diately brought to Leibniz’s mind Spinoza’s view that God, or Nature, is one
substance that contains the attributes of thought and extension (among
infinite other attributes). Spinoza’s view was widely criticised as heretical
and atheistic. However, Masham, like Locke, claims that we do not know
the nature of substance. She notes that claims that minds/souls are unex-
tended and are interacting with extended substances pose two questions: (1)
how could something exist that is not extended, and (2) how could such an
entity interact with something that is extended? Given that we only have
access to some of the qualities of substances, and that those substances we do
know about are all extended, we do not have enough information to make
certain claims about the nature of spiritual substance is in itself.
11 Masham’s assertion of both solid and non-solid extension is also reminiscent of HenryMore’s views,
with which she was likely to be familiar. See Reid 2012.
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Given her views above, we can infer that human beings, forMasham, are
likely composed of two extended substances – one with solidity and one
without. She seems to hold that it is likely that it is spiritual substance that
thinks. Of course, Masham cannot claim that we can be certain of this. But
if there are two substances in union that create human beings, her view
seems to be that they must both be extended to allow for some sort of
connection and interaction between them. Thus, Masham’s solution to
mind and body interaction is to claim that these two substances (if indeed
they are two) are not completely distinct.
Masham’s views about the existence and nature of God are also based
primarily on reasoning about our experience of the world. She claims that
our love for those around us gives us reason to believe that the one who
created us also loves us. Masham writes,
And like as our own Existence, and that of other Beings, has assur’d us of the
Existence of some Cause more Powerful than these Effects; so also the
Loveliness of his Works as well assures us, that that Cause, or Author, is
yet more Lovely than they, and consequently the Object the most worthy of
our Love. (Masham 1696: 64)
Even though there are some instances of misery and pain in the world, the
overall pleasing nature of the world suffices to show us that the author loves
and cares for those creatures he creates. Masham believes that through
recognition of the pleasing nature of the world, we come to love other
creatures. This experience provides us with the idea of love, and leads us to
the belief that God, who is ultimately responsible for the existence of the
beings that bring us pleasure, loves us and we should love him. She writes
in Occasional Thoughts,
And as we delight in our selves, and receive pleasure from the objects which
surround us, sufficient to indear to us the possession and injoyment of Life,
we cannot from thence but infer, that this Wise and Powerful Being is also
most Good, since he has made us out of nothing to give us a Being wherein
we find such Happiness, as makes us very unwilling to part therewith.
(Masham 1705: 61–2)
Since we have been provided with faculties of sensation, reflection, and
reason, and the external objects that are necessary for our pleasure and
happiness, we can infer that the first cause of the universe is good.
Moreover, Masham believes that since we can know that God gives us
pleasure, he is worthy of love, and so we have a moral duty to love him. She
writes, ‘The Duty then that we are taught is plainly what reason requires,
viz. That we love the most lovely Being above all others’ (Masham 1696:
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44).12Our greatest love is reserved for the most lovely being (the being who
is most pleasing to us), but this does not preclude our loving his creation.
Other created beings are pleasing to us, and we have a moral duty to love
them, as they are gifts to us from God.13
Masham also addresses the issue of the unity of God. For although she
has, up to this point, argued that the first cause of the universe is intelligent,
powerful, and good, she has not shown the cause to be a singular substance.
Masham makes the case in two parts. First, she argues that the attributes
manifest when we contemplate the universe – intelligence, wisdom, power,
and goodness – must inhere in a substance. The substance that contains
these attributes is the first cause, i.e., God. She writes,
And thus, by a consideration of the Attributes of God, visible in the Works
of the Creation, we come to a knowledge of his Existence, who is an
Invisible Being: For since Power, Wisdom, and Goodnesss, which we
manifestly discern in the production and conservation of our selves, and
the Universe, could not subsist independently of some substance for them to
inhere in, we are assur’d that there is a substance whereunto they do belong,
or of which they are the Attributes. (Masham 1705: 62)14
Masham holds that since the universe is the product of power, goodness,
and wisdom, there must be a directing mind which is the substantial first
cause of the entire universe. Second, Masham argues that we can see that
there must be one ‘steady, uniform, and unchangeable’ will that directs all
things, and that we can know this from the ‘frame and government of the
universe’ (Masham 1705: 68–9). She writes,
. . . the DivineWill cannot be (like ours) successive Determinations without
dependence, or connection one upon another; much less inconsistent,
contradictory, and mutable; but one steady, uniform, unchangeable result
of infinite Wisdom and Benevolence, extending to, and including All his
Works. (Masham 1705: 69)
Ultimately, Masham’s claim that we can know the unity of God rests on
two inferences, each of which is based on our experiences of the world.
12 Masham often uses the term ‘duty’ without any qualification. I believe that Masham would make no
distinction between a moral and a rational duty, although she never discusses the issue explicitly. She
does say that our natural good and our moral good are the same Masham 1705: 78.
13 Masham spends quite a bit of time in the Discourse discussing our duty to love other creatures. See,
for example, Masham 1696: 13–4, 16, and 23–4.
14 Masham does not give an account of how attributes inhere in substances. However, when Leibniz
objects to Masham’s suggestion that all substances are extended, he claims that surely she holds that
God is a counterexample to her view. However, Masham does not respond to this objection. I take
her silence to indicate that she does not see God as a counterexample. For more insight on this
matter, see Sleigh 2005.
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First, we know that the properties that the first cause has must inhere in
a substance. Second, we know that there is only one substance because
otherwise we would not find the consistency and unity of laws and
purposes that we find in the universe.
In addition to what we can know through reason and experience,
Masham holds that we know through revelation that God rewards us for
our virtue and punishes us for our sins. In order for humans to be
responsible for their actions, they must be able to make some determina-
tions about which desires they will pursue. Masham holds that human
beings are free to weigh the circumstances, benefits, and possible outcomes
of their actions by the use of reason. Once we have decided what action is
best for us, we are free if we are able to act on this preference. She writes,
But God having made Men so as that they find in themselves, very often,
a liberty of acting according to the preference of their own Minds, it is
incumbent upon them to study theWill of their Maker; in an application of
the Faculty of Reason which he has given them, to the consideration of the
different respects, consequences, and dependencies of Things, so as to
discern from thence, the just measures of their actions in every circumstance
and relation they stand plac’d in. (Masham 1705: 70–1)
While it is true that all human beings desire pleasure and happiness, it is
still possible that we be mistaken about what we should do.Masham claims
that we have a liberty of acting in accordance with our preferences. Even
though she claims we often have the liberty of doing as we will, she
nowhere says that we have the liberty of willing as we please. Her few
comments about liberty all seem to confirm that she believes humans have
freedom of action rather than freedom of will, and that her position is, as
was not unusual at the time, a compatibilist view of freedom.15 Masham
held that liberty was necessary in order for moral responsibility, both in this
life and the next. As Jacqueline Broad (2006: 505) writes, ‘Masham thus
affirms that liberty, or will as self-determination combined with practical
judgment, is a necessary condition for accountability’. However, it should
be noted that what she writes of liberty of action is consistent with
agnosticism regarding the extent of our freedom.16 Masham writes,
We being then indu’d, as we are, with a capacity of perceiving and distin-
guishing these differences of Things; and also with a liberty of acting, or not,
15 In seventeenth century debates, freedom of action is often described as ‘the ability to do what you
will’, while freedom of will is ‘the ability to will as you wish’. Freedom of action is compatible with
one’s will being subject to deterministic laws and processes, while freedom of will usually requires
that the will not be included in such causal chains.
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suitably and agreeably hereunto; whence we can according to the preference
of our own minds, act either in conformity to, or disconformity with, the
Will of the Creator (manifested in his Works no less than the Will of any
Humane Architect is in his) it follows, That to act answerably to the nature
of such Beings as we are, requires that we attentively examine, and consider
the several natures of Things, so far as they have any relation to our own
actions. (Masham 1705: 64)
Masham’s views on liberty may be somewhat undeveloped in her works,
but she clearly was concerned with both theological determinism and
freedom of action sufficient for moral responsibility. In the correspon-
dence with Leibniz, she worries that his ‘hypothesis’ of pre-established
harmony might not be consistent with human freedom. She writes in
a letter dated 8 August 1704,
I will, however, now mention to you one difficultie . . . Viz how to reconcile
your Systeme to Libertie or Free Agencie: for tho in regard of any compul-
sion from other causes, we are according thereto free, yet I see not how we
can be so in respect to the first mover. . . . I cannot make out Libertie either
with or without any Hypothesis whatsoever. Tho as long being persuaded
that I feel myself a free agent and that freedome to act is necessarie to our
being accountable for our actions, I not onlie conclude we are indu’d
therewith, but am very tenacious hereof. (Leibniz 1923: 585602)
Here, again, we see Masham insisting upon freedom of action. But she also
expresses the worry that, at least with respect to the system of pre-
established harmony Leibniz advocates, our freedom might not be com-
patible with God’s attributes. However, Masham does seem to think that
our inner feeling of being free, along with the knowledge that we are
morally accountable to God for our actions, is good evidence that we
are, in fact, free. In her own works, Masham argues that without the ability
to act contrary to the will of God, there would be no perfection nor any
defect in creatures. She writes,
16 Masham’s views on freedom of action are very like those of Locke (Locke 1979: 233–86). Although
Masham’s views very closely resemble Locke’s views, they also resemble her father’s, Ralph
Cudworth, views. It is possible that Cudworth’s views influenced Locke. Although Cudworth’s
A Treatise of Freewill was not published until 1838, Locke might have had access to the manuscript at
the Masham estate Hutton 2015. In addition, it was fairly common that unpublished manuscripts
were passed around. Jacqueline Broad (Broad 2006) notes that there is some evidence that Masham
did not inherit her father’s manuscripts and suggests that Locke’s views on free will might have come
from Masham herself. Cudworth, although a libertarian with respect to free will, held that willing
was the self-determination of an individual that is directed towards the good, and that freedom of
the will is necessary for moral accountability. He also held that there is no distinction between
willing and understanding or intellect, but that these are powers of the self, see Cudworth 1996.
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But as without a capacity in The Creature to act contrary to the will of the
Creator there could be no defect, or self-excellency in any Created Being;
contrariety to the Will of God is therefore permitted in the Universe as
a necessary result of Creaturely imperfection, under the greatest endowment
that a Created Being is capable of having, viz. That of Freedom or Liberty of
Action: And as the constitution of such Creature, as this, implies that what is
best in reference to the design of the Creator, and of its own Happiness,
should not be always necessarily present to the Mind as Best; such
a Creature may oppose the Will of his Maker with various degrees of
Guilt in so doing; or (possibly) with none at all; for no Agent can offend
farther than he wilfully abuses the Freedom he has to act. (Masham 1705: 33)
Masham argues that the imperfection of creatures – our inability to always
judge what is best correctly – leads to willing contrary to our creator.
However, we are also given the tools necessary to improve our judgements
by the right use of reason.
As we have seen, Masham’s positive arguments with respect to meta-
physical issues concern the nature of God and humans insofar as they are
necessary to understand our duty to God, creatures, and ourselves. Her
arguments are based on reason guided by experience and revelation, and
are their conclusions are limited by the extent of human knowledge.
Conclusion
While Masham is critical of metaphysics as an a priori endeavour into the
nature and essence of substances, she is happy to use experience, reason,
and revelation to discuss aspects of God and the world. She does not think
that it is useful to posit metaphysical hypotheses that cannot be known
through experience, and she has no patience for those that demean God’s
wisdom or creation. Her metaphysical concerns lie mainly in those issues
that are necessary to understand that God exists, that his creation is good
and useful, and that we have the ability to achieve virtue and happiness in
this world and the next.
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